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NOTE
CAN COURTS REPAIR THE CRUMBLING FOUNDATION
OF GOOD CITIZENSHIP? AN EXAMINATION OF
POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO SOCIAL
STUDIES CUTBACKS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Eli Savit*
In the wake of No Child Left Behind, many public schools have cut
or eliminated social studies instruction to allot more time for math
and literacy. Given courts' repeated celebration of education as the
"foundation of good citizenship," this Note examines potential legal
claims and litigation strategies that could be used to compel social
studies instruction in public schools. This Note contends that the
federal judiciary's civic conception of education leaves the door
slightly ajar for a Fourteenth Amendment chrallenge on behalf of
social studies-deprived students, but the Supreme Court's refusal in
San Antonio v. Rodriguez to recognize education as a fundamental
right leaves potential federal challenges with substantial barriers to
success. A state-law litigation strategy might prove more effective.
In many states, constitutional education provisions or education-
related judicial precedent strongly imply that public schools have a
duty to provide students with social studies. States' education stan-
dards or the history surrounding the adoption of education
provisions may also suggest that a constitutionally adequate educa-
tion necessarily includes social studies instruction. Thus, although
challenges to schools' curricular decisions are not sure to succeed,
courts present a potential venue in which social studies-deprived
students may be able to vindicate a right to civic education.
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INTRODUCTION
Although Sacramento's Martin Luther King Jr. Junior High (M.L.K.)
bears the name of a civil rights titan, a number of its students are barred
from taking classes dedicated to such topics as slavery, the Bill of Rights,
and the Civil Rights Act. In fact, many students at M.L.K. are forbidden
from taking classes that include explicit instruction about their school's na-
mesake. Of course, if curiosity gets the best of them, every one of the
school's students is presumably free to check out a biography of Dr. Martin
Luther King from the public library, watch a History Channel show on the
civil rights movement, or look up the Bill of Rights on Wikipedia. But while
students are presumably allowed to study history, civics, and government on
their own time, about 125 low-performing M.L.K. students are barred from
taking any formal classes dedicated to these subjects.' Indeed, while they are
inside the schoolhouse gates, the school's lowest-performing students are
prohibited from taking any subjects except reading, math, and gym.
M.L.K.'s de-emphasis of civic education is hardly anomalous. In the
wake of the federal No Child Left Behind law-which larfely ties federal
school funding to students' scores on reading and math tests -36 percent of
American school districts reported reducing or eliminating civics, history,
economics and government instruction (hereinafter collectively referred to
as "social studies"). 4 Districts containing academically struggling schools
1. See Sam Dillon, Schools Cat Back Subjects to Push Reading and Math, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2006, at Al.
2. Id.
3. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006).
4. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, CHOICES, CHANGES, AND CHALLENGES: CURRICULUM AND IN-
SrRUCTION IN THE NCLB ERA 7 (rev. 2007), available at http://civicmissionofschools.org/site/
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that, like M.L.K., serve predominantly black, Hispanic, or lower-income
populations5 are apparently most likely to cut social studies: districts with
high minority or socioeconomic populations are most likely to contain
6schools that are "designated for improvement" under No Child Left Behind,
and over half of the school districts that contain a school "designated for
improvement" under No Child Left Behind reported reducing or eliminating
social studies instruction. Of course, an increased emphasis on reading and
math-and a corresponding de-emphasis of other subjects-is in some ways
an inevitable response to No Child Left Behind. No Child Left Behind
requires states to impose a series of consequences on schools whose
students fail to make adequate progress towards math and reading
proficiency,' and it is only natural that schools and districts would increase
instruction time allotted to these subjects.
But No Child Left Behind is not solely responsible for the decline in
civic education. In fact, schools' commitment to social studies has steadily
eroded since the 1960s,9 when students were commonly required to take as
many as three courses in civics, democracy, and government.' The reasons
that schools de-emphasized social studies in the pre-No Child Left Behind
era are unclear, but at least one commentator suggests that schools feared
criticism or litigation if teachers dared broach politically or historically
controversial subjects."
Given the state of social studies in America, it is perhaps predictable that
many American students fail to meet grade-appropriate standards in civics,
history, and government. According to the 2006 National Assessment of
Educational Progress (N.A.E.P) report, only 24 percent of American fourth
documents/choices-changes-and-challenges-curriculum-and-instruction-in-the-ncb-era.pdf/view?
searchterm=None (finding that 36 percent of all school districts had reduced social studies instruc-
tion after the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act).
5. See Dillon, supra note 1.
6. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No CHILD LEFr BEHIND ACT: EDUCATION
ACTIONS COULD IMPROVE THE TARGETING OF SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT FUNDS TO SCHOOLS MOST IN
NEED OF ASSISTANCE 25 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08380.pdf.
7. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, supra note 4, at 7. In fact, these statistics may actually overstate
the amount of instructional time dedicated to social studies, because many school districts encour-
age their teachers to teach reading or math skills during classes that are theoretically devoted to
social studies. See id. at 8 ("[O]fficials from one school in Chicago explained that the school...
tries to fit in at least 30 minutes for all other disciplines; however, as one Chicago school official
pointed out, 'our major focus is in reading and math.'"; id. at 9 (quoting an Escondido Union
school official as saying that the district unsuccessfully "tri[es] to integrate ... social studies stan-
dards at the same time [as] ... literacy").
8. 20 U.S.C. § 6311.
9. See CARNEGIE CORP. OF NY & CTR. FOR INFO. & RESEARCH ON CIVIC LEARNING &
ENGAGEMENT, THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOLS 14-20 (2003), available at http://civicyouth.org/
PopUps/CiviceMissionofSchools.pdf (documenting a steady de-emphasis of civic education require-
ments in the 1980s and 1990s); Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History, Current
Status, and the Future, 62 ALB. L. REv. 1425, 1431 (1999) (thirty states do not require high school
students to take civics or American government).
10. CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y. ET AL., supra note 9, at 14.
11. Id. at 15.
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graders, 22 percent of eighth graders, and 27 percent of twelfth graders
scored at or above a "proficient" level on a federally administered civics
assessment. 2 A 2008 study by the educational advocacy group Common
Core concluded that "too many young Americans do not possess ... basic
knowledge ... about U.S. history and culture." 3 Fewer than half of the
American seventeen-year-olds questioned by Common Core could place the
Civil War in the proper half-century, nearly a quarter could not identify
Adolf Hitler, and a third did not know that the Bill of Rights guarantees
freedom of speech and religion. 4 Studies also reveal a social studies
achievement gap: African American and Hispanic students consistently per-
form worse than their white counterparts on civics tests; middle- and upper-
income students consistently outperform their lower-income peers. 5 Unsur-
prisingly, the social studies achievement gap manifests itself among adults
as well. One comprehensive survey of adults showed that on each of sixty-
eight questions testing respondents' civic and political knowledge "whites
are more informed than blacks; those with higher incomes are more in-
formed than those with lower incomes; and older citizens are more informed
than younger ones.""
The de-emphasis of social studies in American schools has been widely
criticized on both pedagogical and policy grounds. 7 Professor E.D. Hirsch,
for example, argues that schools' focus on reading and writing at the ex-
pense of social studies actually hinders students' reading comprehension.
On Professor Hirsch's account, literacy requires "domain-specific" back-
ground knowledge over and above the meaning of words.'9 Without knowing
the rules of baseball, for example, an individual can never make sense of a
sentence that reads "Jones sacrificed and knocked in a run," even if that per-
son understands the literal meaning of the words on the page.20 And just as
12. ANTHONY D. LUTKUS & ANDREW R. WEISS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE NATION'S RE-
PORT CARD: Civics 2006 1 (2007), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2006/
2007476.pdf.
13. Lynne Munson, Letter from the Executive Editor, in FREDERICK M. HESS, STILL AT RISK:
WHAT STUDENTS DON'T KNOW, EVEN Now 1 (2008), available at http://www.commoncore.org/
docs/CCreport_stillatrisk.pdf.
14. Id. at 1-2.
15. Meira Levinson, The Civic Achievement Gap 5 (Ctr. for Info. & Research on Civic
Learning & Engagement, Working Paper No. 51, 2007), available at http://www.civicyouth.org/
PopUps/WorkingPapers/WP5 1 Levinson.pdf.
16. Id. (quoting MICHAEL DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 157 (1996)).
17. See, e.g., Ctr. for Civic Educ., Talking Points on the Need to Restore the Civic Mission of
Schools, http://www.civiced.org/pdfs/campaignToPromoterTalkingPoints.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2009). See generally E.D. HIRSCH, JR., THE KNOWLEDGE DEFICIT (2006) (arguing that American
students' poor reading scores are a result of a lack of "cultural knowledge").
18. E.D. Hirsch, Jr., The Case for Bringing Content into the Language Arts Block and for a
Knowledge-Rich Curriculum CoreforAll Children, AM. EDUCATOR (Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Wash.,
D.C.), Spring 2006, at 8, 8.
19. HIRSCH, supra note 17, at 17.
20. Hirsch, supra note 18, at 8.
1272 [Vol. 107:1269
Legal Challenges to Social Studies Cutbacks
readers of the sports page must have an adequate understanding of baseball
rules, Professor Hirsch argues that a literate individual in America must
have an adequate understanding of history, current events, and politics, be-
cause background knowledge in those areas is often "taken for granted in
... public orations, in serious radio and TV, [and] in books and magazines
and newspapers addressed to a general audience."2' Professor Hirsch notes
that American schools' de-emphasis of content-based instruction leaves
many graduates with insufficient background knowledge to understand even
basic newspaper articles, a fact that has "momentous implications for educa-
tion, and for democracy as well. 22 Professor Hirsch is hardly alone in
arguing that social studies cutbacks threaten substantial damage to American
democracy.2 The Center for Civic Education, a group dedicated to reviving
social studies instruction, cites a study showing that students who receive
explicit instruction in civic education are more likely to vote than students
who do not.2 Another study shows that students who receive explicit civic
education are significantly more likely to "take personal responsibility for
making things better in their community and nation."25 And former Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has sharply criticized schools' de-
emphasis of social studies, arguing that, in the face of efforts to politicize
the judiciary, civic instruction on the structure of American government is
the "only long-term solution to preserving an independent judiciary and...
a robust constitutional democracy.
' 26
Although no major commentators advocate petitioning the courts to im-
pose minimum standards for a civic education, a judicial challenge on
behalf of students who have been deprived of social studies is not obviously
unworkable. The American judiciary has a long history of determining
schools' obligations to students and the scope of students' educational
rights.27 More importantly, because many school districts apparently feel
pressured by No Child Left Behind to de-emphasize civic education, a judi-
cial order may be necessary to compel social studies instruction. Even the
21. Id. at 17.
22. HIRSCH, supra note 17, at 74. Hirsch cites Thomas Jefferson's famous quote: "[W]ere it
left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers with-
out a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every
man should receive these papers and be capable of reading them." Id.
23. See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor & Lee H. Hamilton, Op-Ed., A Democracy Without
Civics?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 18, 2008, at 9; Richard Gephardt, Editorial, True Democ-
racy Requires Us to be Engaged in Society, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 2008, at B9.
24. Ctr. for Civic Educ., supra note 17, at 3.
25. Id.
26. Seth Schiesel, Former Justice Promotes Web-Based Civics Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2008, at E7.
27. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that Louisiana could not condi-
tion the teaching of evolution on simultaneous teaching of creation science); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding students' right to engage in symbolic
speech on school grounds); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C. 1967) (holding that a




best laid plans for educational reform are likely to fall flat without some
counterweight to the current incentives that lead schools to cut social studies
in the first place, and a legislative counterweight does not appear to be
forthcoming. In the political realm, much of the recent focus on education
reform has been on fixing funding shortfalls, expanding early childhood
education, and ensuring high teacher quality, not on modifying schools' cur-
riculum-narrowing incentives." In fact, public opinion is apparently divided
as to whether a renewed focus on social studies is even a worthwhile goal. A
recent poll shows that most Americans oppose No Child Left Behind as it is
currently written,29 but a slim majority of Americans also think that it is a
"good thing" if increased emphasis on reading and mathematics results in
reduced emphasis on other subjects.30
But courts are not beholden to public opinion or legislative trends, and
the judiciary could easily neutralize schools' curriculum-narrowing incen-
tives by issuing an injunction requiring schools to dedicate instructional
time to social studies. Such an injunction would hardly be anomalous:
courts regularly exercise oversight over schools' curricular decisions,3' and,
on occasion, order schools to provide instruction in a certain subject.32 Func-
tionally speaking, a court order requiring social studies instruction would
leave local school districts in control over the school day, but would place
substantial social studies cutbacks outside the range of permissible curricu-
lar options.33 In this way, judicially mandated social studies instruction
would function like state statutes that require public schools to dedicate in-
structional time to health or physical education.34
This Note examines the potential legal claims that could be brought to
compel social studies instruction in public schools that have cut back or
eliminated instruction in the subject. Part I argues that the federal judiciary's
historic emphasis on citizenship in education laid the groundwork for legal
28. See, e.g., Bruce Alpert, Obama, McCain Differ on Education; Parts of Both Plans Good,
Valas Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 23, 2008, at 1 (comparing education poli-
cies of 2008 major-party presidential nominees).
29. William J. Bushaw & Alec M. Gallup, Americans Speak Out-Are Educators and Policy
Makers Listening?, 90 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 9, 10 (2008).
30. Id. at 17.
31. See Wiley v. Franklin, 474 F Supp. 525 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (retaining supervision over a
school district's proposed Bible study curriculum); Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998) (re-
quiring the implementation of full-day kindergarten, technology programs, and college preparatory
programs in a New Jersey school district).
32. See Johnson v. Sch. Comm. of Brockton, 358 N.E.2d 820 (Mass. 1977) (requiring a high
school to provide behind-the-wheel driver's education during school hours).
33. The financial ramifications of such an order would likely depend on the budgetary incli-
nations of legislators. Individual school districts could be forced to reallocate funds to pay for social
studies instruction; alternatively, the legislature could increase total school funding to comply with
the judicial mandate.
34. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 1003.455 (2008) (requiring 150 minutes per week of physical educa-
tion for elementary students, and one class period per day for middle school students); 105 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-6 (West 2008) (requiring daily physical education for all public school
students); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 4723 (2008) (requiring health education in secondary
schools).
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challenges to a complete deprivation of social studies under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But such claims are
unlikely to succeed under rational basis review, and the difficulty in identi-
fying a suspect class--combined with the Supreme Court's holding in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez35 that there is no funda-
mental right to education-presents substantial difficulties to such federal
challenges. Still, Part I concludes that a Fourteenth Amendment claim chal-
lenging social studies cutbacks might succeed if those cuts were found to
infringe upon a constitutionally protected minimum "quantum '3 6 of educa-
tion. Part II argues that a more viable litigation strategy would focus on state
constitutional law, as many state constitutions' education provisions can be
construed to require social studies instruction. In addition, decisions in cases
involving school financing schemes have left many states with a judicially
defined conception of education that suggests a mandate for social studies
instruction. In states that have not already embraced a civic conception of
education, Part II argues that litigators can successfully challenge social
studies cutbacks if they can show that constitutional framers attached civic
meaning to education. Finally, Part II concludes that a court could theoreti-
cally require social studies instruction by holding that a state's academic
standards for students are the legislative definition of "education" in the
state constitution.
I. POTENTIAL FEDERAL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO A
DEPRIVATION OF SOCIAL STUDIES
This Part argues that the federal judiciary's historic emphasis on citizen-
ship in education opens the door to legal challenges under the Fourteenth
Amendment based on a deprivation of social studies, though such challenges
face substantial barriers to success. Section I.A establishes that courts have
long held that civic education is a primary goal of public schools. Although
courts often construe civic education as a right held by states, Section L.A
argues the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education" shows
that public schools also have an obligation to provide students with a mini-
mally adequate foundation for participation in civic life. Section I.B
examines how an individual right to civic education might be vindicated via
Fourteenth Amendment claims brought on behalf of social studies-deprived
students. It concludes that, because social studies-deprived students are
probably not a suspect class, and because the Supreme Court has held that
education is not a fundamental right, there are substantial barriers to the
potential success of such claims. Section I.C briefly examines how, in light
of these constraints, Fourteenth Amendment claims on behalf of students
deprived of social studies might succeed.
35. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
36. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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A. The Federal Judiciary's Civic Framing of Education Cases
For much of the twentieth century, the federal judiciary explicitly em-
braced the notion that civic education is a primary goal of public schools. In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters38 the Supreme Court struck down on substantive
due process grounds an Oregon law requiring children to attend public
school, but gave the state government broad regulatory power over private
and parochial schools. The Court was unmistakably concerned with ensur-
ing that private schools provided students adequate civic education: "[n]o
question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate
all schools ... [because] certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship
must be taught."39 In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,'° the Court
held that schools' citizenship-training function permits districts to discipline
students for obscene speech. Working from the proposition that the "role
and purpose of the American public school system [is to] ... prepare pupils
for citizenship in the Republic,"' the Court held that it is a "highly appro-
priate function of public school education" to prohibit students from using
language that would be offensive in democratic discourse.4 And in Mozert v.
Hawkins County Board of Education,43 the Sixth Circuit upheld a school
district's right to require students to study a specified curriculum even in the
face of their parents' religious objections. Crucial to the Mozert holding was
the court's belief that that the state has a legitimate interest in socializing
children to act as citizens in a pluralistic society." Although none of these
cases deal with social studies directly, the repeated invocation of public
schools' civic mission suggests that social studies cutbacks may contravene
a judicial vision of education.
By itself, though, the federal judiciary's civic conception of education in
cases like Pierce, Fraser, and Mozert are of limited utility in a potential
challenge to social studies cutbacks, for nothing in these cases suggests that
schools have an affirmative requirement to provide a basic civic education.
Insofar as civic education is concerned, Pierce, Fraser, and Mozert merely
suggest that states have an interest in training children to be good, effective
citizens. Pierce does not impose on states a duty to ensure that children take
courses essential to good citizenship; Fraser does not require that states in-
struct students on the norms of democratic discourse; Mozert does not
mandate a specified curriculum to prepare citizens for life in a pluralistic
society. These cases establish citizenship training as a legitimate basis for an
exercise of state power-not an affirmative requirement on the state, or a
38. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
39. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).
40. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
41. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 681 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at 683.
43. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
44. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069.
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source of individual rights. Indeed, the Pierce Court's celebration of civic
education is most often used against parent and student plaintiffs who levy
First and Fourteenth Amendment claims in an attempt to escape state over-
sight of private school or home-school curriculum.
45
Yet a key passage in Brown v. Board of Education-perhaps the most
important judicial decision of the twentieth century47  Suggests that the
civic nature of education is a source of individual rights against the state as
well. In Brown, the State of Kansas defended its "separate but equal" system
of public schools by arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment could not pro-
hibit segregation in public schools because public schools across America
were already segregated in 1868, when the Amendment was ratified.4' But,
noting that the historical evidence was in any case inconclusive,49 the Court
declined to consider the state of public education in 1868. Instead, the Court
considered "public education in the light of its full development and its pre-
sent place in American life throughout the Nation."' Public education, the
Court continued, is uniquely important precisely because it serves such a
valuable role in training citizens. The Court described education as "the very
foundation of good citizenship" and noted that public schools are "a princi-
pal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values."'" In part because
schools give children the knowledge needed to participate as citizens, the
Court called public education "perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments" and emphasized its "importance ... to our democ-
ratic society."5 " Therefore, Brown held that when states undertake the
responsibility of providing education, it "is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms. 53
45. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972) (White, J., concurring) ("[Pierce]
lends no support to the contention that parents may replace state educational requirements with their
own idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy member of
society."); Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing the "good citi-
zenship" language in Pierce in support of a school district's right to survey elementary school
students about sex); Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109, 113 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (citing the
"good citizenship" provision of Pierce in dismissing home-schooling parents' claims that the state
of Michigan's teacher certification requirement violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights);
Combs v. Homer Ctr. Sch. Dist., No. 04CV1599, 2005 WL 3338885 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2005) (citing
Pierce in dismissing home-schooling parents' claims that state standards that required teaching,
among other things, American and Pennsylvanian history violated their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights).
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Review of ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CUL-
TURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003), http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu/cotbro.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2009) (quoting Professor Mark Tushnet as calling Brown "the most important decision by the
Supreme Court in the twentieth century").
48. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 492-93.





The Court's conception of public education-based largely on the prop-
osition that schools play a vital role in citizenship training-was crucial in
Brown, for the Court's holding was explicitly limited to education. Instead
of overruling Plessy v. Ferguson* or holding that separate public facilities
for blacks and whites constituted a per se violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court made particularized findings that were, in theory,
narrowly applicable to the educational realm. Brown's holding is that "in the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."5
Because findings of fact in the court below showed that the black and white
16schools at issue enjoyed equal-quality facilities, curricula, and teachers, the
Brown decision was based on the notion that separate educational facilities
generate a "feeling of inferiority" among black children.57 According to the
Court, those feelings of inferiority have a tendency to "[retard] the educa-
tional and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of
some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school."58
Brown did not specify the exact educational benefits denied to black stu-
dents in segregated schools, because the Court was concerned with the ends
of education. On the Court's account, feelings of inferiority hindered black
students' learning, leaving them on unequal footing in the many dimensions
of modem society that abut education. 9 Key among these was the civic di-
mension: Brown's language about education's role in a "democratic society"
suggests that an inadequate education ultimately left black students on a
rickety "foundation of good citizenship."6 In short, Brown found segregated
schools unconstitutional in part because they systematically caused black
students a civic injury.
The Court's conception of education in Brown thus provides fertile
ground for potential lawsuits on behalf of students who have been deprived
of social studies. Social studies-deprived students can allege that they suffer
a civic injury that is, if anything, even more direct than the civic injury suf-
fered by the students in Brown. After all, a substantial percentage of
American school districts have cut or eliminated formal instruction in civics,
government, and history-the very subjects, arguably, that most closely
correlate to citizenship.6' A case can be made that large swaths of students
are being systematically denied the opportunity for fully adequate participa-
tion and engagement in American civic life. Social studies-deprived students
may or may not be haunted by "feelings of inferiority," but, insofar
54. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
55. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 492.
57. Id. at 494.
58. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting an unreported finding of a three-judge panel sitting
in Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
59. See id. at 493-94.
60. Id. at 493.
61. For arguments regarding the centrality of social studies to democracy, see HiRscH, supra
note 17, at 74; Schiesel, supra note 26; and Ctr. for Civic Educ., supra note 17, at 3.
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as their subpar education hampers participation in American democracy,
their ultimate civic injury is analogous to that in Brown.
The federal judiciary's civic conception of education is not strictly
necessary for a Fourteenth Amendment suit on behalf of social studies-
deprived students; after all, equal protection claims can be raised whenever
the state treats people differently.62 But the general judicial attitude toward
education suggests that courts may be more willing to get involved in states'
education policies when those policies abut schools' civic mission. And
while cases like Pierce, Fraser, and Mozert show that civic language can be
used to justify deference to states, Brown suggests that courts will also take
a hard look at a state's education policy when it derogates civic outcomes
for individuals.
B. Levels-of-Scrutiny Analysis: A Barrier to Equal Protection
Challenges to Social Studies Cutbacks
A federal claim brought on behalf of social studies-deprived students
against public schools would need to be raised under the Fourteenth Amend-
63ment's Equal Protection Clause. States have no affirmative obligation to
provide children with a public education-much less a social studies educa-
tion-at all. Indeed, for all its celebration of education's civic value, Brown
itself recognizes the states are not required to operate public schools, hold-
ing that education "where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms."64 A Fourteenth
Amendment claim on behalf of social studies-deprived students must thus
claim that education is not being provided on equal terms, because many
states' educational regimes are set up so that large swaths of children are
denied a civic education. So long as some schools in the state offer social
studies, an equal protection challenge could allege that a state-through its
62. See, e.g., Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that individuals can
raise a "class of one" suit alleging differential governmental treatment with no rational basis); N.Y
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (holding that a suit brought on behalf of metha-
done users alleging that New York City policy banning methadone users from working in public
transit violated the Equal Protection clause). But see Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct.
2146, 2150 (2008) (holding that the "class-of-one" theory does not apply in the public employment
context).
63. A state ban on social studies instruction in public and private schools could almost cer-
tainly be challenged as an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty under the Due Process Clause-
indeed, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibits states from
banning certain scholastic subjects. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state law forbidding public
and private schools from teaching languages other than English violates the Due Process Clause).
But the Due Process Clause is not likely to help today's social studies-deprived students because no
state has actually made social studies instruction illegal. In Meyer, students were banned from get-
ting a foreign language education anywhere; in states that have cut social studies, students simply
cannot receive social studies instruction in their local public school. Although these students are
functionally barred from learning social studies, a state is in accordance with the Due Process
Clause so long as it does not make illegal parents' rights to have their children learn a certain sub-
ject.
64. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
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public schools-operates a fundamentally unequal educational system when
it lets localities make the decision to deny students a civic education.
Yet the mechanism traditionally applied in equal protection cases sug-
gests that a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to social studies cutbacks
faces substantial barriers to success. Unless a state action involves a suspect
class or impinges on a fundamental right, equal protection challenges to
state action are decided under the rational basis test.61 Under the rational
basis approach, state classifications are given the presumption of constitu-
tionality: courts will not hold that a state action is unconstitutional so long
as it is "reasonably tailored to achieve [the State's legitimate] ends."6 In
practice, rational basis review does not lead to the invalidation of states' dis-
tribution of social and economic benefits so long as there is some
conceivable, legitimate state objective behind a classification. 6 And while
the wisdom of cutting social studies may be debatable, most schools that cut
social studies instruction replace it with math and literacy instruction, so
social studies cutbacks seem motivated by a desire to promote literacy and
68mathematical competence.
Given the broad deference that courts usually grant state actors in ra-
tional basis cases, the promotion of literacy and mathematical competence
almost certainly qualifies as a legitimate state objective. Indeed, some edu-
cators make the argument that students who are struggling in basic math and
reading should not be forced to spend a substantial part of their day learning
social studies. Former U.S. Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings de-
fended schools' decisions to narrow their curriculum in response to No
Child Left Behind, saying "[r]eading and math are fundamental basic skills
without which you can't learn social studies, history, so on, and so forth."69
In the same vein, a school superintendant in a Texas district that cut most
subjects in favor of more math and reading said, "it's like basketball. If you
can't make layups, then you've got to work on layups" '7 Arguments like
these are not necessarily right-indeed, they are hotly debated from a peda-
gogical perspective7 '-but the schools' motivations are at least tenable,
legitimate, and coherent, and that seems to be all that courts require under
the rational basis test."
65. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
66. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 85 (1988) (alteration in original)
(quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78 (1972)).
67. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980).
68. See CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, supra note 4, at 1.
69. Eddy Ramirez, The Education Secretary Talks About NCLB, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/2007/11/05/the-education-secretary-talks-
about-nclb.htm.
70. Dillon, supra note 1.
71. For an excellent argument that cutbacks in the amount of time schools spend teaching
social studies actually hurts students' literacy, see HIRSCH, supra note 17.
72. Courts rarely inquire into the "correctness of [states'] legislative judgments" under ra-
tional basis review, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981), so the
pedagogical soundness of states' decisions to cut social studies is unlikely to be at issue. The types
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An equal protection challenge to social studies cutbacks could fare bet-
ter if courts apply strict scrutiny, but-in large part because of adverse
precedent in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez -it is
doubtful that courts would find the requisite involvement of a suspect class
or impingement on a fundamental right. In Rodriguez, a class of public
school students alleged that Texas's school financing system violated the
Fourteenth Amendment because it allowed for unequal funding of public
schools.74 Texas did provide all schools with money from the state coffers to
ensure a "basic minimum education," but local school districts raised the
rest of their funds through property taxes. 75 As a result, schools in districts
with valuable property tended to be better funded than districts with less
76taxable wealth . The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
students in financially struggling school districts constitute a suspect class,
writing that the "large, diverse, and amorphous" class of children had not
been "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majori-
tarian political process.
77
More importantly, Rodriguez rejected the claim that education is a fun-
damental right under the U.S. Constitution. The Rodriguez plaintiffs argued
that, although it is not mentioned in the Constitution, education is a funda-
mental right because it bears a close nexus to other Constitutional rights. In
particular, the plaintiffs argued that education is "essential to the effective
exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the
right to vote.' 78 While the Court did not dispute the proposition that the
"democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate,"7 9 it denied that the
federal judiciary has "either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the
citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice."80 In
a striking departure from Brown's depiction of public education as the "very
foundation of good citizenship"' the Rodriguez Court refused to distinguish
the civic nature of education from such personal interests as food and shelter.
The Court speculated that, like the ill-educated, the "ill-fed, ill-clothed, and
of cases that fail under rational basis review are those where the classification is inexplicable except
by "animus toward the class it affects." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
73. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
74. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-6.
75. Id. at 1, 7-9.
76. Id. at 11-14.
77. Id. at 28.
78. Id. at 35.
79. Id. at 36 (punctuation omitted).
80. Id.
81. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the political proc-
ess.'
82
Less damning-but still damaging-to an equal protection claim chal-
lenging social studies cutbacks is Rodriguez's holding that Texas children in
poorer districts do not constitute a suspect class. Even without Rodriguez, it
would be difficult for students challenging social studies cutbacks to estab-
lish suspect class status, as the Court has only held that a handful of
classifications-race, gender, and possibly religion-automatically warrant
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 3 Additionally, it
would be difficult to even define a suspect class comprised of social studies-
deprived students, as the schools that cut or eliminate social studies serve a
diverse cross-section of American students. Rodriguez, though, further
constrains the potential avenues that a plaintiff class of students might have
used to invoke strict scrutiny. Districts that have cut social studies tend to
serve academically struggling students; many districts that have cut social
studies contain at least one school that has been designated for improvement
under No Child Left Behind." Most of the schools designated for improve-
ment-though not all-serve high-poverty areas.8 6 But post-Rodriguez,
classification based on the wealth of a school district cannot establish a sus-
pect class. Furthermore, if a "large, diverse, and amorphous" class of
children who go to school in financially struggling districts does not qualify
as a suspect class, it would be difficult to claim that the "large, diverse, and
amorphous" class of children who attend school in academically struggling
districts demonstrates the "traditional indicia of suspectness. 87
Although social studies cutbacks seem to disproportionately affect racial
minorities, any attempt to invoke strict scrutiny by claiming a disparate ra-
cial impact is also likely to fail. Schools that are "in need of improvement"
under No Child Left Behind-and are thereby more likely to cut social stud-
ies-do tend to serve high percentages of racial minorities. As a result, cuts
in social studies probably affect racial minorities more than white children,
and several studies have shown a racial achievement gap in social studies.8 9
But in disparate impact cases, courts generally require proof of racially dis-
criminatory intent or an invidious purpose by the state decision maker.0
82. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
83. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,
375 n. 14 (1974) (religion); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race).
84. See CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, supra note 4, at 6-7 (explaining the results of a study show-
ing that urban, rural, and suburban schools have increased the time devoted to English language arts
and math while making corresponding cutbacks in the time devoted to social studies).
85. See id. at 7.
86. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 26.
87. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
88. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 25.
89. See Levinson, supra note 15.
90. E.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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There is little evidence that state actors who cut social studies do so with
any "invidious" purposes. Again, most schools cut social studies to focus
more instructional time on math and reading-hardly the type of evidence
of invidiousness that has led courts to invalidate state actions on disparate
impact grounds.9 Absent some contemporaneous or historical evidence that
minorities were deprived of social studies for discriminatory or invidious
reasons, a disparate impact argument is likely to fail.92
Yet in spite of the limitations imposed by Rodriguez and disparate racial
impact jurisprudence, it is possible to envision at least one case in which
social studies cutbacks could warrant strict scrutiny. In one of the University
of Michigan's affirmative action cases, Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court held
that all governmental race classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, in-
cluding those ostensibly enacted to aid a minority group.93 Thus, courts
would almost certainly apply strict scrutiny if a school explicitly used race to
determine which students received social studies, even if that classification
was meant to help racial minorities succeed in reading and math. For example,
a system that required Hispanic students who failed reading tests to forego
social studies-while imposing no such restriction on non-Hispanic stu-
dents-would likely be subject to strict scrutiny. While such explicit use of
race would likely be subject to strict scrutiny, the triggering of strict scrutiny
would not lead to an automatic invalidation of the state classification. As
Grutter showed, strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact. 94 Yet if a plaintiff class
could show that it had been deprived of social studies on the basis of race,
strict scrutiny would shift the burden of proof to the state, forcing schools to
show how cutting social studies for discrete racial groups is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling state interest."
The idea that schools would let race determine students' curricular op-
tions is not so farfetched. No Child Left Behind requires that students in
each "major racial and ethnic group[]" make adequate yearly progress in
91. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama statute
that disenfranchised people convicted of crimes of "moral turpitude" because race played a decisive
role in its passage in 1901); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (holding that an at-large system
of elections violated the Fourteenth Amendment because of historical evidence that it had been
maintained to impede the political participation of African Americans).
92. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. discussed six factors that
courts will examine when dealing with state actions that are facially neutral but have a racially dis-
parate impact. 429 U.S. at 266-68. They include 1) whether the impact of a law is so clearly
discriminatory that there is no explanation other than that it was adopted for an impermissible pur-
pose; 2) the historical background of a decision; 3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision; 4) departures from normal procedural sequence; 5) whether the factors usually
considered important by the decision maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached;
and 6) legislative or administrative history, especially where there are contemporary statements by
members of the decision-making body. Id.
93. 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
94. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995)).
95. See id. at 327.
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S96math and reading, and schools manipulate both their data and instruction to
ensure that they hit their targets. According to the Associated Press, nearly
two million minority students' scores were not counted for the purposes of
No Child Left Behind because of a "loophole" that allows individual states
to exempt racial subgroups that are not "statistically significant."97 On the
instructional side, No Child Left Behind often dictates the amount of in-
structional attention that certain students receive.98 To maximize the chances
that a school makes adequate yearly progress, teachers in many schools are
told to focus the bulk of their instructional time on "bubble kids" who sit on
the threshold of passing the state tests.99 Given the degree to which students'
race and test scores affect data reporting and instruction, it is not implausi-
ble that some schools might use race to determine which students receive
social studies and which receive remedial math and reading. A race-based
system, after all, would help to ensure that the "major racial groups" make
adequate yearly progress in math and reading. Such explicit use of race
would not be unconstitutional per se, but it would trigger strict judicial scru-
tiny, allowing students who are denied a civic education on the basis of race
a chance to overcome some of the adverse precedent in Rodriguez.
C. A Constitutionally Protected Quantum of Civic Education?
In spite of its holding that education is not a fundamental right,
Rodriguez leaves the door slightly ajar to equal protection challenges based
on a denial of public education's civic benefits. Although Rodriguez holds
that education cases do not necessarily trigger strict scrutiny, the Court
speculated that there might be some constitutionally protected "quantum of
education" that is a prerequisite to the "meaningful exercise" of First
Amendment freedoms and the right to vote.'0° But the Court did not actually
reach the question of whether a constitutionally protected quantum of edu-
cation exists. According to the Court, no charge could seriously be made
that Texas violated students' theoretical quantum, because Texas's financing
system allowed students to attain the "minimal skills necessary for the en-
joyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political
process.''o Rodriguez thus appears to hold that while an equal education is
not a fundamental right, federal courts might still entertain arguments that
states with operative public schools have an obligation to provide all stu-
dents with a minimally adequate quantum of education. This reading of
96. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,20 U.S.C. § 631 l(b)(2)(C)(v)(H)(bb) (2006).
97. Associated Press, 2 Million Scores Ignored in 'No Child' Loophole, MSNBC, Apr. 17,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12357165/.
98. See Jennifer Booher-Jennings, Rationing Education In an Era of Accountability, 87 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 756, 758-59 (2006) (reporting that "data-driven" schools are encouraging teachers
to focus their energy on "bubble kids" because it is "realistic and time-efficient").
99. Id.
100. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
101. ld.at37.
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Rodriguez is buttressed by a footnote explaining that the plaintiffs' case
would be "far more compelling" if they had been "absolutely precluded
from receiving an education."' ° Yet because the state of Texas provided
what "it consider[ed] to be an adequate base education," the Court saw no
reason to invalidate its financing system. 3
Plyler v. Doe... appears to lend further support to the notion that states
cannot deprive certain students of a minimum, constitutionally protected
quantum of education. In Plyler, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas
statute that allowed local districts to bar children of illegal immigrants from
enrolling in public schools. Although the case was brought under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court did not specify a standard of review, and re-
fused to hold that the Texas statute disadvantaged a suspect class or involved
a fundamental right.' But while the Court cited Rodriguez's holding that
education itself is not a fundamental right, it also held that education is not
"merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of
social welfare legislation. ' 6 In differentiating education from other gov-
ernmental benefits, the Court relied on the civic nature of education-much
as it had three decades earlier in Brown. Education, the Court wrote, has a
"pivotal role ... in sustaining our political and cultural heritage."'0 7 Public
schools, said the Court, are the "most vital civic institution[s] for the preser-
vation of a democratic system of government. ' ' Therefore, by completely
denying children of illegal immigrants access to public schools, the Court
held that Texas unconstitutionally denied the plaintiff class "the ability to
live within the structure of our civic institutions, [thus] foreclos[ing] any
realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the
progress of our Nation.' "
If a constitutionally protected quantum of education exists, Plyler and
Rodriguez both provide support for the argument that it includes at least a
minimal civic component. No court has actually ruled on whether there is a
protected quantum of education, so the question of what actually constitutes
a constitutionally adequate basic education remains speculative." But inso-
far as Plyler and Rodriguez endorse the notion of a protected quantum of
102. Id. at 25 n.60.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
105. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19 ("We reject the claim that 'illegal aliens' are a 'suspect
class.' "); id. at 223 ("Nor is education a fundamental right... .
106. id. at 221.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
109. Id. at 223.
110. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) ("[Tlhis Court has not yet definitively
settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a




education, it seems clear that the Court was at least partially motivated by
the civic nature of education. In Plyler, the Court was faced with a relatively
easy case. The Texas statute allowed districts to completely bar a class of
students from public schools; logically, an absolute deprivation of education
also deprives students of a constitutionally protected quantum. Yet the Court
repeatedly discussed some of the concrete benefits education provides, pro-
viding a glimpse into what the boundaries of a protected quantum might be.
Literacy was one crucial component of education-the Court referred more
than once to the costs that illiteracy imposes on both individuals and soci-
ety. "' Critically, the Court also paid tribute to the notion that education
allows students to participate in civic institutions, and that public schools
preserve a democratic system of government by transmitting to students the
"values and skills upon which our social order rests.""' Unlike cases like
Pierce, Fraser, and Mozert-where the state had an interest in training pub-
lic school students to function in civic life-Plyler, like Brown, presents this
socialization interest as a right that can be invoked by individual students
against the state. Similarly, Rodriguez speculates that a constitutionally pro-
tected quantum of education is an individual right that would give students
the skills and knowledge to adequately exercise their First Amendment
rights and enjoy "full participation in the political process.""' Although
Rodriguez rejects the argument that education is a fundamental right, its
conception of a protected quantum of education accepts the plaintiffs'
proposition that education bears a close nexus to political rights.
The civic language in Plyler and Rodriguez thus provides support for an
argument that cutbacks to social studies impinge on students' constitution-
ally protected quantum of education. After all, a strong case can be made
that students need adequate civic instruction if they are to be prepared for
"full participation in the political process" 114 or participation in civic institu-
tions. Social studies-according to such an argument-is a uniquely
important subject because basic knowledge of history and government is the
price of admission to equal participation in American democracy. An indi-
vidual who does not know that the federal Constitution establishes a series
of checks and balances is unlikely to understand contemporary debates
about the scope of the Vice President's power;... an individual who does notknow that the Bill of Rights guarantees the freedom of speech may be afraid
Ill. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222-23.
112. Id. at 221.
113. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
114. Id.
115. Twenty percent of American eventeen-year-olds could not correctly identify the Consti-
tution as establishing a series of checks and balances in a 2008 survey. HEss, supra note 13, at 7.
The issue of vice-presidential power was raised in the vice-presidential debate during the 2008
election. See Gwen Ifill, Moderator, Vice Presidential Candidates Debate at Washington University
in St. Louis (Oct. 2, 2008) (transcript available at http://pamm.wustl.edu/debate08/pdfl
transcripLpdf) ("Do you believe as Vice President Cheney does, that the Executive Branch does not
hold complete sway over the office of the vice presidency, that it it [sic] is also a member of the
Legislative Branch?").
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to publicly voice controversial views. " ' Indeed, political leaders-who pre-
sumably took social studies-tend to assume that the electorate has a basic
knowledge of history. For example, during the 2008 presidential campaign,
one major foreign policy issue was whether American leaders should nego-
tiate directly with the leaders of rogue nations." 7 Opponents of direct
negotiations repeatedly referred to World War II and the "appeasement" of
Adolf Hitler."' But a citizen who never learned about World War II-and,
like 10 percent of American seventeen-year-olds, thought that Hitler was a
German munitions maker" 9-would be severely disadvantaged if she tried
to make sense of, or participate in, that debate. Social studies, the argument
goes, prepares students to act as citizens in a democratic society in a way
that other subjects do not. Simply teaching children to read and write is in-
adequate: if schools do not teach students the background knowledge
needed to read a newspaper, watch a political speech, or decipher a cam-
paign pamphlet, those students will not be prepared for what Rodriguez
called the "meaningful exercise"'20 of participatory democratic rights.''
Thus, if indeed there is a constitutionally protected quantum of education,
Plyler and Rodriguez suggest that cutbacks in social studies could be out-of-
bounds because of the subject's centrality to the civic nature of education.
Yet the degree to which Plyler and Rodriguez actually establish height-
ened protection in the educational realm is unclear. In Plyler, the Court went
out of its way to avoid holding that the Texas statute impinged on a funda-
mental right, so the question of whether there even is a constitutionally
protected quantum of education is still unresolved. Indeed, the Court de-
cided Plyler without even establishing a level of scrutiny. Professor Julie
Nice has argued that Plyler was decided under a "third-strand" of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, in which courts quietly apply heightened scrutiny "not
only for fundamental rights or for suspect classes but also for situations
where the rights and classes interact in such a way as to raise the Court's
116. Thirty-three percent of American seventeen-year-olds did not know that the Bill of
Rights guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of religion. HEss, supra note 13, at 7.
117. Compare Barack Obama, CNN/YouTube Democratic Presidential Debate (July 23, 2007)
(transcript available at http:llwww.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/07/23/debate.transcriptl) ("[Tihe no-
tion that somehow not talking to countries is punishment to them-which has been the guiding
diplomatic principle of this administration-is ridiculous."), with Glenn Kessler & Juliet Eilperin,
McCain Assails Obama Over Readiness To Talk With Hostile Foreign Leaders, WASH. POST, May
21, 2008, at A7 (quoting two speeches by John McCain attacking Obama's willingness to meet with
foreign leaders).
118. E.g., President George W. Bush, Address to Members of the Israeli Knesset (May 15,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/16267/) (comparing those who would
"negotiate with the terrorists and radicals" with Nazi appeasers); Posting of Elisabeth Bumiller to
The Caucus: The New York Times Politics Blog, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com2008/05/15/
mccain-agrees-with-bushs-remarks/ (May 15, 2008, 11:34 EST).
119. Munson, supra note 13, at 1.
120. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
121. See IRSCH, supra note 17, at 68-79.
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suspicions."'22 On Professor Nice's account, the class of immigrant children
in Plyler was already marked by illiteracy and undereducation. 123 The Texas
statute denying those children an education triggered heightened scrutiny
precisely because it abridged a benefit that was uniquely important to that
class.
But even if Professor Nice's "third-strand" framework is correct, Professor
Nice probably erred in limiting the quasi-suspect class in Plyler to immigrant
children-as opposed to children generally-so Plyler still provides strong
support for the notion that there exists a constitutionally protected quantum of
education. It is true that the Court considered the relationship between im-
migrants and education. For example, the Court was concerned that barring
a "disfavored group" from schools would deprive them of the means to
"raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority.' ' 124 But the
benefits of education cited in Plyler-along with civic participation, the
Court mentions literacy, self-reliance, and social, economic, and psycho-
logical well-being 2-are benefits that are critical for every member of
society, not just a particular class of immigrant children. Indeed, for most of
the Plyler decision, education is discussed as a right that is of critical impor-
tance for every member of society, regardless of affiliation with a quasi-
suspect class. Plyler approvingly cites Brown to note that "it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed" without education., 26 The
Court further notes that "[t]he inability to read and write will handicap the
individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of his life.'
2 7
Distinguishing education from other forms of social welfare, Plyler holds
that "the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and
the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark[s] the dis-
tinction."'' 28 Plyler does mention the need to socialize children of
immigrants-it warns of "significant social costs ... when select groups are
denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order
rests."' 129 Presumably, though, the same social costs would attach regardless
of the group being denied an education. The relevant characteristic that the
plaintiff class shares in Plyler is not that they are children of illegal immi-
grants, but simply that they are children. Indeed, the Court repeatedly refers
to the class as "innocent children,"'3 ° suggesting that their national origin
and documentation statuses are secondary compared to the characteristics
122. Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recogniz-
ing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1999).
123. Id. at 1238.
124. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 223 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
127. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 224 & n.21,230.
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they share with all other youth in the state of Texas. Thus, even if the Court
in Plyler quietly applied heightened scrutiny under a third-strand analysis, it
did so because it is particularly important for children not to be deprived of
an education-not because of education's importance to a narrower class of
immigrant children. Because nearly every education case involves children,
even a third-strand reading of Plyler ends up supporting the notion that there
is a constitutionally protected quantum of education.
On balance, though, the notion that federal courts will find that social
studies cutbacks impinge on a protected quantum of education remains du-
bious. The biggest hurdle, of course, is that no court has found that a
protected quantum of education even exists. Although the complete depriva-
tion of education in Plyler was apparently enough to trigger heightened
equal protection scrutiny, the Court subsequently refused to extend Plyler's
application "beyond the unique circumstances ... that provoked its unique
confluence of theories and rationales."'31 Even assuming the existence of a
protected quantum, it is not at all clear that social studies would necessarily
be included in that quantum, despite the subject's seemingly close correla-
tion to the civic nature of education. Federal courts often wax poetic about
the virtues of a civic education and its role in American democracy, but rare-
ly specify the exact skills or knowledge that students need to, say, ensure the
"preservation of a democratic system of government."'32 When courts do talk
about a particular subject in conjunction with civic education, that subject is
most often literacy. In Rodriguez, for example, the Court endorsed the view
that "a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and
thought processes have been adequately developed."'33 In Plyler, the Court
paid lip service to the civic nature of education-but the only specific bur-
den that Plyler mentioned was the cost of illiteracy.' The Court did not
mention the hardships that immigrant children face when they are shut out
of political debates, or the stigma they endure as a result of not understand-
ing the political process. Of course, a strong argument can be made that
individuals are not functionally literate when they lack enough knowledge
about history, politics, and government to understand a story in a newspa-
per.'35 At the very least, such individuals are probably not literate in a way
that allows them to engage in democratic society.136 Still, given social stud-
ies' conspicuous absence from judicial decisions, a court could find that a
constitutionally protected quantum of education includes only the opportu-
nity to learn the bare essentials of reading and writing.
131. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
132. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
133. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973) (emphasis added).
134. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
135. HIRSCH, supra note 17, at 74.
136. Id.
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Finally, Rodriguez was, in many ways, the opening shot in a series of
judicial battles in which the federal judiciary ultimately elevated school dis-
tricts' local control over most other educational considerations. During the
Civil Rights Era, the Supreme Court used the Brown decision and its deseg-
regation mandate to powerfully and intrusively override local and state
government decisions. But Rodriguez marked a shift in the judiciary's em-
phasis, and has been repeatedly cited in support of the proposition that
"education is primarily a concern of local authorities."'31 The federal judici-
ary's current emphasis on local control over education makes it doubtful that
courts will interfere in local districts' curricular choices--even if those
choices involve substantial cutbacks to the civic education courts histori-
cally celebrated.
II. POTENTIAL STATE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO A
DEPRIVATION OF SOCIAL STUDIES
This Part argues that education provisions in state constitutions provide
a viable basis for legal challenges based on a deprivation of social studies
education."' Section II.A shows that education provisions impose substan-
tive requirements on state legislatures, and many education provisions may,
on their own terms, endorse a civic dimension to education. Furthermore,
although states diverge in their interpretations of education provisions, many
state courts have interpreted education provisions in a way that suggests
students must receive social studies instruction. Section II.B examines state
courts' methods of interpreting education provisions and concludes that a
137. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2826 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[L]ocal school
boards better understand their own communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice
will best meet the educational needs of their pupils."); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248
(1991) ("Local control over the education of children allows citizens to participate in decisionmak-
ing, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit local needs.").
138. There is almost no chance that a court would find such a suit to be preempted by the No
Child Left Behind Act, either because Congress means to occupy the field of public education or
because social studies presents a conflict to No Child Left Behind's goals. First of all, No Child Left
Behind is not even binding on the states-the federal government simply requires that states follow
its provisions as a condition for receiving Title I money. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20
U.S.C. § 6311 (a)(]) (2006). Second, No Child Left Behind is deferential to state sovereignty, as
states are actually permitted to create their own curricular standards, assessments and benchmarks
for math and literacy. Id. § 631 l(b)(l). It is thus extremely implausible that the federal government
means to occupy the educational field by enacting a scheme "so pervasive ... that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it." English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Nor would social studies instruction
present an obstacle to Congress's goals in No Child Left Behind. It is clearly possible to have stu-
dents meet standards in math and literacy while taking social studies classes. Therefore, if No Child
Left Behind were to preempt lawsuits seeking to vindicate a right to a civic education, one would
have to read the statute as having the objective of making students competent in math, reading and
(possibly) science and expressly excluding all other subjects. But No Child Left Behind plainly
contravenes that reading: one stated purpose of the Act is "to improve the quality of civics and gov-
emiment education by educating students about the history and principles of the Constitution of the
United States." 20 U.S.C. § 6712(1). Given a general presumption against preemptory readings of
state law, see, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991), it is extremely unlikely that any
suit seeking to vindicate a right to civic education would be preempted.
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successful state challenge to a deprivation of social studies would likely fo-
cus on a historical conception of education as the foundation of good
citizenship. Finally, if education provisions cannot, of their own accord, es-
tablish a requirement for states to provide all students with social studies,
Section II.C argues that those provisions can theoretically be read in con-
junction with state curricular standards to establish that requirement.
A. The Civic Dimensions of State Education Provisions
Post-Rodriguez, education-related equal protection claims appear to
stand a better chance under state constitutions than under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Whereas education is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution,
all fifty state constitutions contain a provision requiring the state legislature
to provide for a system of public education. "9 Although the language in state
education provisions varies, they tend to be brief, vague, and do not typi-
cally impose specific curricular requirements-many merely require the
legislature to provide an "efficient" system of public schools,' 4° while others
require a "quality" education. 4 1 Still, regardless of their precise language,
the existence of education provisions in state constitutions means that state
courts do not need to search for an implied right to education, nor do state
courts necessarily need to impose a levels-of-scrutiny analysis for educa-
tion-related claims.
State courts fall into four major groups when analyzing the role of state
education provisions in education-related equal protection cases. Courts in
the first and largest group, probably consisting of a majority of states,' 2 rely
exclusively on the state education provision in ruling on education-related
equal protection claims. These courts' reasons for exclusive reliance on their
education provisions vary, but this first group of states can be broken into
three subgroups according to the courts' rationale. In the first subgroup of
states, seminal education cases apparently have not invoked equal protection
139. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARtZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST.
art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. Vin, § 1; IOWA
CONST. art. IX, 2d, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME.
CONST. art. VI, pt. 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST, ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a);
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2,
art. LXXXIU; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CoNSr. art. XII, § 1; N.Y CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C.
CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 1; OR. CONST. art. VIE, § 3; PA. CONST. art. in, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art.
XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH
CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68; VA. CONSI. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W.
VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
140. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183.
141. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1;VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
142. For a synthesis of state courts' reasoning in education cases, see Lobato v. State, No.
06CA0733, 2008 Colo. App. LEXIS 69 (Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008).
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provisions at all, necessitating an analysis under the education provision.143
In the second subgroup, plaintiffs rely on both the education and equal pro-
tection provisions of the state constitution, but courts explicitly reject
arguments that their equal protection clause imposes any obligations beyond
the state education provision.'" State courts in the third subgroup simply do
not reach claims brought under the state's equal protection clause, holding
that the state's education provision itself suggests an equal protection com-
ponent. 45 For example, in Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 v.
Bishop, the Arizona Supreme Court declined to consider arguments that the
state's school financing system violated the Arizona Constitution's equal• 46
protection clause. Instead, the court read an equal protection component
into Arizona's education provision, holding that the clause imposed a duty
on the legislature to finance education in a way that "does not ... create
substantial disparities among schools, communities or districts.'
' 47
Other states look beyond their education provision when deciding edu-
cation-related equal protection cases. A second set of courts--consisting of
at least nine states-uses the education provision in the context of an equal
protection analysis. These courts analyze education-related equal protection
claims under the state equal protection clause, but cite the education provision
as proof that education is a fundamental right, thus triggering strict judicial• 48
scrutiny. In contrast, the third group of state courts-consisting of Colorado,
Illinois, Kansas, Rhode Island, and perhaps Michigan--de-emphasize their
state's education provision when deciding whether education is a fundamen-
tal right. Rather than focusing on the express obligations that their education
provision imposes on the legislature, state courts in this third group analo-
gize their state constitution to the U.S. Constitution, and use Rodriguez to
explicitly hold that education is not a fundamental right under the state con-
143. See, e.g., Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity &
Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 2007); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997).
144. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville
County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
145. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 2002)
("[B]ecause we conclude that the clear language of Article 14 imposes upon the State an absolute
constitutional duty to educate our children, we conclude that it is unnecessary to reach the issue of
whether a fundamental right is also implied."); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 129
P.3d 1199, 1208 (Idaho 2005) (holding that the "thoroughness" requirement of the Idaho education
provision required the legislature to provide funds for poorer Idaho schools to repair building facili-
ties).
146. 877 P.2d 806, 811 (Ariz. 1994).
147. Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist., 877 P.2d at 816.
148. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,
374 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359
(N.H. 1997); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994); Pauley v.
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000);
State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d 518, 535 (Wyo. 2001).
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stitution.149 Finally, at least four state courts analyze claims involving the
distribution of educational resources under both the education and the equal
protection clauses of their state constitutions, but avoid addressing the ques-
tion of whether education is a fundamental right."0
At least in theory, a state claim based on social studies deprivation could
prevail under any state regime. Of course, challenges to social studies cut-
backs are probably more likely to succeed in states where education is seen
as a fundamental right, because the state's decision to allow social studies
cuts would then presumably be subject to strict scrutiny under a federal
equal protection analogue."' But unlike a federal equal protection challenge,
a state constitutional challenge to social studies cutbacks need not be en-
tirely dependent on the application of strict scrutiny. Even in the majority of
states, where education is not seen as a fundamental right, the education
provision clearly imposes some substantive requirements on the legislature.
A challenge to social studies cutbacks could thus succeed in any state if it
could show that the state legislature is in dereliction of its constitutional
duty when it does not provide a civic education to all students.
5 2
In fact, in many states, an argument that the legislature has a duty to
provide students with social studies can be based on the plain language of
the education provision. Although most state constitutions do not impose
substantive curricular requirements,'53 a number of state constitutions en-
dorse the view that education's importance is bound up in the participatory
nature of democracy. The education provisions in Indiana and New Hamp-
shire celebrate "knowledge and learning" as "essential to the preservation of
a free government,"' 5 while Idaho, Minnesota, and South Dakota's provi-
sions declare that the "stability of a republican form of government"
depends mainly on the "intelligence of the people."'55 Six other states' edu-
cation provisions draw on John Adams's language in the Massachusetts
149. See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982); Comm. for
Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1194 (II1. 1996); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885
P.2d 1170, 1188 (Kan. 1994); E. Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 49 (R.I. 1995).
150. See Sch. Admin. Dist. No. I v. Comm'r, Dep't of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me. 1995);
Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter,
851 S.W.2d 139, 152 (Tenn. 1993); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
151. See Claremont Sch. Dist., 703 A.2d at 1358 ("When governmental action impinges fun-
damental rights, such matters are entitled to review under the standard of strict judicial scrutiny.").
But see Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist., 511 N.W.2d at 259 (applying intermediate scrutiny in school fund-
ing context, while leaving open the possibility that strict scrutiny could be used in other educational
contexts).
152. State education cases that are analyzed as "fundamental rights" cases are typically not in
danger of being overturned by the post-Rodriguez U.S. Supreme Court. State courts base their find-
ing that education is a "fundamental right" on the state constitution, so such holdings rest "on an
adequate and independent state ground" and are therefore not reviewable in federal court. Sochor v.
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 533 (1992).
153. The lone exception is Hawaii, which explicitly requires the legislature to promote "the
study of Hawaiian culture, history and language." HAW. CONST. art. X, § 4.
154. IND. CONST. ar. VIII, § 1; N.H. CoNsT. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII.
155. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIH, § 1; S.D. CoNs'r. art. VII, § 1.
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Constitution of 1780, 56 and assert that the general diffusion of knowledge
among the people is essential to "the preservation of [their] rights and liber-
ties."'57 Three more state provisions see an educated populace as "necessary
to good government."'58 And North Dakota's education provision makes the
nexus between democracy and education explicit, declaring that a "high
degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of every
voter in a government by the people [is] necessary ... to insure the continu-
ance of that government."'5 9
In states that explicitly celebrate the civic nature of education, a litigator
challenging the deprivation of social studies could plausibly claim that the
legislature is in dereliction of its constitutional duties when it allows schools
to cut or eliminate civic education. After all, it seems implausible that the
general populace can act to preserve "rights and liberties" if they are un-
aware of the content of those rights, or even that those rights and liberties
exist. Similarly, if a state really believes that a wise and knowledgeable po-
pulace is the vanguard of republican government, that populace should
presumably be armed with an understanding of that government's structure,
history, and functions. Of course, these hortatory civic education clauses
could be read as nothing more than preambles that impose no duties on the
legislature.' 60 At the very least, though, civic education clauses do suggest a
constitutional conception of education that is not being met if students re-
ceive an inadequate social studies education.
Other states' education provisions lack this type of civic language, but
the legacy of school finance litigation-in which many state courts were
asked to define the contours of an "adequate" education-suggests that
many state courts still interpret those provisions to require the teaching of
social studies. After Rodriguez established that wealth-based school funding
disparities do not violate the federal Equal Protection Clause, school finance
litigation largely shifted to state courts. In state after state, litigants asked
courts to decide whether the resources available to a school district could be
constitutionally based on the property wealth of the district. 16 Although a
few state courts initially required legislatures to impose equal per-pupil ex-
penditures, most courts that invalidated school financing systems held that
156. John Dinan, The Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence from the
Constitutional Convention Debates, 70 ALB. L. REv. 927, 940 & n.38 (2007).
157. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MASS. CONST, ch. V, § 2; Mo.
CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (stating that knowledge is
"essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people").
158. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2. Arkansas's education provision
states that "intelligence ... [is] the bulwark of a free and good government." ARK. CON T. art. XIV,
§ 1.
159. N.D. CoNsT. art. VIII, § I (emphasis added).
160. See Dinan, supra note 156, at 939.
161. See William S. Koski, Achieving "Adequacy" in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 13, 20 (2007).
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the funding regime did not provide sufficient resources for students to re-
ceive an adequate education under the state constitution. 
6
2
To define "adequacy," state courts read even the barest constitutional
provisions as imposing a state responsibility to teach a specific curricu-
lum-one that often included a civic dimension. In Pauley v. Kelly, the West
Virginia Supreme Court held that the state constitution's provision for "tho-
rough and efficient" schools required the legislature to provide a system in
which every child was offered instruction in core subjects, including gov-
ernment and social ethics. 16 Ten years later, in Rose v. Council for Better
Education, the Kentucky Supreme Court cited the West Virginia decision as
a mandate to broadly interpret its own constitutional provision requiring an
"efficient" school system. 164 The Kentucky court read "efficient" as requir-
ing the state to provide students with the opportunity to attain seven basic
"capacities."' 65 At least three of these capacities suggest a need for formal
social studies instruction: the court required schools to provide students with
the opportunity to attain "sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and po-
litical systems," "sufficient understanding of governmental processes," and
the capacity to "appreciate [their] cultural and historical heritage."' 66 Signifi-
cantly, both Kentucky and West Virginia's constitutional education
provisions are bare and unadorned. Neither provision contains laudatory
language about the civic virtues of education, nor, like some states, do they
explicitly require "quality" or "adequate" state schools. 61 Yet both courts
read constitutional language requiring "thorough" and "efficient" schools as
requiring the legislature to provide for a specific-albeit vaguely defined-
curriculum. Most importantly, both courts held that a constitutionally man-
dated level of instruction required that students receive some semblance of a
civic education, suggesting that virtually any education provision can be
interpreted as requiring social studies instruction.
In fact, in dealing with school finance cases, a number of state courts
seem to suggest that the legislature must provide students with the opportu-
nity to attain a civic education. In Leandro v. State, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the state constitution's education clause requires
162. See id.
163. 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
164. 790 S.W.2d 186, 209-10 (Ky. 1989).
165. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
166. Id.
167. Compare Ky. CONST. § 183 ("The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation,
provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State."), and W. VA. CONST. art.
XHI, § 1 ("The Legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free
schools."), with FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § l(a) ("The education of children is a fundamental value of
the people of the State of Florida.... Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, effi-
cient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a
high quality education ... ."), GA. CONST. art. VlI, § 1 ("[Pirovision of an adequate public educa-
tion for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia."), MONT. CONsT. art. X,
§ 1(3) ("[L]egislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and secondary
schools."), and VA. CONST. art. VIII, § I ("The General Assembly ... shall seek to ensure that an
educational program of high quality is established and continually maintained.").
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the state to provide students with "sufficient fundamental knowledge of ge-
ography, history, and basic economic and political systems to enable the
student to make informed choices with regard to issues ... ."' The Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina Supreme Courts adopted
Kentucky's seven Rose competencies as their states' definition of a constitu-
tionally adequate public education;' 69 for good measure, the New Hampshire
court added that "broad exposure to the social, economic, scientific, techno-
logical, and political realities of today's society is essential for our
students." 7°
In a string of school finance cases, New York's highest court worked un-
der the assumption that its education provision is fashioned to allow public
school graduates to "function productively as civic participants capable of
voting and serving on a jury."'' This civic participation reading of the edu-
cation provision ultimately led the court to conclude that children are
entitled to "up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics,
science, and social studies."'' In 2003, the New York high court gave its
civic participation reading an even sharper bite, affirming a trial court's
holding that productive citizenship "means more than just being qualified to
vote or serve as a juror, but to do so capably and knowledgeably."'
' 73
And in a case that did not directly involve school financing, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court laid out an extremely robust conception of education's
relationship to democracy. The court held that "education prepares students
for active involvement in political affairs" by "stimulat[ing] an interest in
the political process and provid[ing] the intellectual and practical tools nec-
essary for political action.' 74 Noting the "rise of the electronic media and
the development of sophisticated techniques of political propaganda," the
California court held that education was "increasingly critical ... in foster-
ing ... habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry.,77 Absent a quality
education, the court continued, "the populace will lack the knowledge, self-
confidence, and critical skills to evaluate independently the pronouncements
of pundits and political leaders.' 76
168. 488 S.E.2d 249,255 (N.C. 1997).
169. McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997). South Carolina modified the
Rose language slightly. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (de-
fining the civic component of a constitutionally adequate education as "the opportunity to acquire
... a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of history and gov-
ernmental processes").
170. Claremont Sch. Dist., 703 A.2d at 1359 (emphasis added).
17 1. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995).
172. Id.
173. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 331 (N.Y 2003) (quoting
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001)).
174. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 40-41 (Cal. 1984).
175. Id. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id.
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Decisions that define education in political, civic, or social terms pro-
vide a framework within which a challenge to social studies cutbacks could
succeed, but such decisions do not, on their own accord, mandate social
studies instruction. Even in states where courts decorate their decisions with
rhetorical celebrations of civic education, students do not apparently have a
real right to an adequate social studies education. In New York City-where
many elementary and middle schools do not even teach social studies-over
eighty percent of eighth graders failed to demonstrate even basic proficiency
in social studies in 2005.' In Massachusetts, poorer students commonly do
not receive any social studies at all.' State decisions celebrating civic edu-
cation-or even defining education as consisting of certain curricular
subjects--did not actually establish judicial enforcement over the teaching
of those subjects. In school finance cases, state courts simply directed the
legislature to retool school funding systems so that each school could poten-
tially provide an adequate education that included social studies. 9 A state
court's history of emphasizing civic education may ultimately help win a
claim based on a deprivation of social studies, but it does not diminish the
need for such a challenge.
Challenges to a deprivation of social studies face even steeper hurdles in
states where courts have refused to define a constitutionally adequate
education.8 Many state courts have expressed separation-of-powers
concerns when interpreting constitutional provisions that explicitly give the
legislature responsibility over schools. In an Illinois school finance case, for
example, the state supreme court refused to interpret a constitutional
requirement that education be "high quality" or "efficient," holding that
educational policy is almost exclusively within the province of the
legislative branch. Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to holda financing system unconstitutional, because doing so would "involve a
177. David M. Herszenhorn, Most City 8th Graders Miss State Norm in Social Studies, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2005, at B8.
178. See Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, *31, *60, *84
(Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2004) (detailing the lack of social studies instruction and other academic defi-
ciencies in four "focus districts").
179. See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997) (ordering
the legislature to come up with a financing model as a prerequisite to the delivery of a constitution-
ally adequate public education); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 348
(N.Y. 2003) (ordering the State to rework its funding formula so that it met the "actual cost of pro-
viding a sound basic education"); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d. 388, 397 (Wis. 2000) (laying out a
comprehensive curricular framework deemed a "sound basic education," but holding that "[slo long
as the legislature is providing sufficient resources ... [a] school finance system will pass constitu-
tional muster"). Hartzell v. Connell, the California case that celebrated the political dimensions of
education, held that public schools could not impose fees for extracurricular high school activities.
See 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984).
180. Approximately half the states in the U.S. have upheld their funding system as adequate,
typically with little explanation of what defines adequacy. See Karen Swenson, School Finance
Reform Litigation: Why Are Some State Supreme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. L.
REv. 1147 app. at 1181-82 (2000).
181. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (I11. 996).
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usurpation of that power entrusted exclusively to the Legislature,"'82 while
the Oklahoma Supreme Court accused the plaintiffs in a school finance case
of "attempting to circumvent the legislative process."'83 Other state courts
refused to interpret the education provision because they saw a lack of
"judicially manageable standards" for resolving the school finance
dispute.' 4
Besides not providing an advantageous judicial conception of education,
decisions like these-which essentially hold education financing schemes
nonreviewable-are tremendously bad precedent for suits challenging a
deprivation of social studies. For one thing, establishing a right to social
studies will likely cost money, and a state defendant could argue that a judi-
cial requirement for social studies instruction directly impinges the
legislature's reserved power over school finance. After all, a district that is
forced to teach social studies will have to reallocate money-and probably
request more from the state-to hire teachers and purchase books and mate-
rials. Even if one assumes that a right to social studies can be established
with no redistribution of funds, courts that read education provisions as
granting the legislature exclusive financial power over schools would likely
grant the legislature exclusive curricular power as well. In order to establish
a right to social studies in these states, a plaintiff class would have to show
that cutting social studies is for some reason within a subclass of constitu-
tionally prohibited educational policy choices. But because courts that defer
to the legislature in school finance cases typically refuse to read any sub-
stance into their education provisions, constitutional protection for civic
education in these states is unlikely to come from judicial precedent.
B. Analyzing History so Students Can, Too: A Litigation Strategy
Based on Originalist Readings of State Education Provisions
To convince a state court that social studies cutbacks are constitutionally
prohibited, litigators should look-fittingly enough-to the history surround-
ing the adoption of that state's education provision. Lacking any explicit
guidance for how to interpret education provisions, courts often look to con-
stitutional convention debates, the intent of the framers, and historical
conceptions of education. The historical record does not necessarily cut one
way or another, as a number of courts have used the historical record both to
broaden and to restrict the meaning of education provisions. 8 California, for
example, established that its education provision contains a political dimen-
sion by citing statements to that effect by the Founding Fathers, the chairman
182. Exparte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002).
183. Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Okla. Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058, 1066 (Okla. 2007).
184. E.g., Marrero ex rel. Tabalas v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 111 (Pa. 1999); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.1. 1995).
185. See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 648 (Idaho 1975) (holding that a dele-
gate to the constitutional convention's statement that the state's duty ends with the teaching of the
three R's "cannot be given its literal meaning" today).
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of the California Constitutional Convention's Committee on Education, and
the "most prominent free school advocate at the time [California's free
school clause] was adopted."'86 At the other extreme, the Illinois Supreme
Court painstakingly examined debates surrounding the adoption of its edu-
cation article before denying that Illinois's provision for an "efficient" and
"high quality" school system guaranteed any substantive, judicially enforce-
able educational rights.'87 Other state courts that looked to history to broaden
their reading of an education provision include those in Arizona, 8' Ken-t. 189 I 9 f / 9 192 .. . 193
tucky, 9 Massachusetts,'90 Ohio,'9 Texas, and West Virginia, while courts
in Georgia, 194 Minnesota, 95 Nebraska, 196 North Dakota,'97 and Rhode Island' 9
held that a historical analysis suggested a restricted reading of their educa-
tion clause. Although the history surrounding state education provisions-
and courts' readings of it-is hardly uniform, owning the historical narrative
would be critical for litigators acting on behalf of social studies-deprived
students. Outside of a historical analysis, different state courts seem to apply
wildly different standards and criteria when interpreting education provi-
sions. One study shows that the wording of a state's education provision
apparently does not influence whether a court will interpret that clause
broadly or narrowly, nor does an examination of precedent from sister states
seem to affect states' readings of these clauses.'99
If courts give serious weight to historical conceptions of education-and
if, as this Note has argued, those courts find that an adequate civic education
requires some instruction in social studies-challenges to social studies cut-
backs should succeed in a number of places. At least fifteen states'
constitutional provisions explicitly endorse a civic dimension to education,2°°
186. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 40 (Cal. 1984).
187. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1185-89 (I11. 996).
188. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
189. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
190. McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
191. Derolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
192. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
193. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
194. McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981).
195. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
196. Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 2007).
197. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994).
198. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
199. Swenson, supra note 180, at 1175. In fact, Swenson examined a number of structural and
legal variables, and found that the only factors that can explain courts' decisions are a) the political
ideology in the state, and b) the amount of money being spent per pupil in financing cases. Id. at
1179.
200. See ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND.
CONST. art. VIII, § I; ME. CONsT. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MASS. CONST. ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Mo. CONsT. art. IX, § 1(a); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII;
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and many other states considered such language during the framing of their
constitution. 0 The framers of a number of state constitutions shared the
premise that education is closely tied to citizenship and republican values,
202even if they did not directly reflect that notion in the education provision.
The history behind education provisions that were first ratified in the eight-
eenth or nineteenth century is particularly helpful for challenges to social
studies cutbacks, as the dominant understanding of education at the time
was a "radical democratic view" that tied education to republicanism.
Even in the twentieth century, some constitutional conventions considered
adding provisions celebrating civic education, although they were some-
times rejected as having no obvious utility.20 At least one state supreme
court held that these twentieth-century debates themselves represented a
civic consensus on education. In 1910, Arizona's framers rejected a draft
that declared education "essential to the preservation of the rights and liber-
ties of the people ... and [t]he stability of a Republican form of
Government" in favor of one that calls for a "general and uniform" public
school system. 20 But the Arizona Supreme Court relied on the debate itself
to establish conventioneers' belief that a "free society could not exist with-
out educated participants" and that education was intricately tied to voting
rights.' 6 It is beyond the scope of this Note to examine the history behind
every state's education provision. Given courts' propensity for examining
the original intent of education provisions, though, litigators challenging a
deprivation of social studies would do well to cite historical records suggest-
ing that states' constitutional framers demonstrated a civic understanding of
education.
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI,
§ 3; TIx. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
201. See Dinan, supra note 156, at 939-41 (describing the debate that took place during the
Tennessee Convention of 1977).
202. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 15 (recognizing in the bill of rights, rather than in the edu-
cation provision, that "free government" is dependent "upon the broadest possible diffusion of
knowledge, and ... the Commonwealth should ... assur[e] the opportunity for [its people's] fullest
development by an effective system of education").
203. Michael A. Rebell, Equal Opportunity and the Courts, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 432, 433-
34 (2008); see also Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). Brigham relied on the view, promi-
nent at the time the Vermont Constitution was ratified, that education was key to fostering
"republican values:' id. at 394, even though the Vermont Constitution does not celebrate education's
civic virtues, VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68.
204. See Dinan, supra note 156, at 940-41.
205. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812 (Ariz. 1994) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1910, at 1064, 1069 (John S. Goff ed., 1991)).
206. Id.
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C. Applying Learning Standards Against the State: A Theoretical
Expansion of the State Definition of "Education"
If education provisions and the legacy of school finance cases do not, of
their own accord, establish a requirement that students receive social studies
instruction, a court could, in theory, find that a state's academic standards
establish a right to social studies. In all fifty states, the legislature empowers
a group of education specialists to define learning standards that all students
are expected to meet; these standards, in theory, drive schools' curricula.' °7
Every U.S. state boasts standards in social studies,08 and these standards are
often fairly robust. For example, Illinois middle schoolers are expected to
"[a]nalyze historical influences on the development of political ideas... as
enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, ' 2 9 while high school stu-
dents are expected to analyze the differences between world political
systems, including democracy, socialism, and communism.' 0 An argument
could be made that these standards represent the legislature's definition of
"education" in the state's education clause. The state, therefore, would be in
dereliction of its constitutional and statutory duties if it does not provide
students with the social studies education detailed in state standards.
So far, though-at least in the school finance context-no state court has
held that state standards impose a substantive legal duty on the legislature.
Although many judges cite the failure of students to meet state standards as
evidence that school systems are inadequate, no court has "gone so far as to
constitutionalize state educational standards."''2 The 2003 Campaign for
Fiscal Equity case exemplified this reluctance to constitutionalize standards.
There, the New York high court refused to adopt the state's ambitious
Regents Learning Standards as the definition of a "sound basic education"
212under the New York Constitution. Although the court ultimately held that
the state's school funding system was inadequate, it cited its own previous
decisions and reaffirmed that a "sound basic education" is one that prepares
students to "function productively as civic participants." But in a concur-
ring opinion, Justice Smith argued that the Regents Learning Standards
should define the contours of a sound basic education. Conceding that state
standards are indeed rigorous, Justice Smith argued they represented the
extent to which the government has "determined that being a productive
207. James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1223,
1228 (2008).
208. See Developing Educational Standards: Social Studies, http://edstandards.org/StSu/
Social.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
209. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., Illinois Learning Standards, 14.F.3a, http://www.isbe.net/ils/
socialscience/pdf/goall4.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
210. Id. at 14.B.5.
211. Koski, supra note 161,at 16.




citizen requires learning the skills the Learning Standards impart. ' 4 Al-
though no court has yet adopted Justice Smith's reasoning, many scholars
believe that courts will soon require legislatures to ensure that their stan-
dards are actually being met.25
Litigation involving social studies cutbacks, though, may be a better
catalyst for a constitutionalization of state standards than litigation challeng-
ing school funding schemes. Professor James Ryan argues that state courts
are reluctant to constitutionalize state standards in part because the issue
invariably comes up in school finance cases."' In school finance cases, Pro-
fessor Ryan argues, courts either implicitly or explicitly adopt a
comparative approach-courts are, Professor Ryan says, concerned with
providing schools with enough money so that students can compete for a
limited number of jobs and spots in higher education." ' Because courts are
concerned with the competitiveness of students, they necessarily look at
what other districts-the competition-are spending, and adjust the reme-
dies accordingly. In contrast, Professor Ryan argues, standards are
fundamentally noncomparative, because they rest on the "tacit assumption
that meeting the standards is enough, even if some schools and students go
well beyond legislatively created standards."2 8 Academic standards, then, do
not "fit easily with the approach taken by most courts" in school finance
cases. 219 But unlike school finance cases, a challenge to social studies cut-
backs could be noncomparative. Social studies, after all, is geared towards
noncompetitive ends, like the ability to act as a citizen, to effectively exer-
cise the right to vote, and to be informed enough to participate in••220
contemporary discourse. For students that have been deprived of social
studies, the opportunity to meet state standards could be enough, so an ar-
gument based on a deprivation of social studies would not necessarily fail,
as both the definition of an adequate social studies education and the rem-
edy could be noncompetitive.
Thus, even if a state constitution does not impose a requirement that stu-
dents receive a civic education on its own right, it is still theoretically
possible that, through its standards, the state might impose that requirement
on itself. Of course, robust standards cost money to implement, and a state
might feel fiscal pressure to scale back the ambitiousness of its standards if
forced by a court to actually implement them. At the same time, though,
political considerations would likely counsel against weakening state educa-
tion standards. After all, if a state gutted educational standards too much in
214. Id. at 355 (Smith, J., concurring).
215. See Ryan, supra note 207, at 1224.
216. Id. at 1238.
217. Id. at 1239.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. One could argue, of course, that learning all that social studies entails places students at a
competitive advantage in the marketplace and so learning social studies really is competitive. Such a
benefit, though, is ancillary to social studies' basic goal of creating informed, engaged citizens.
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response to a judicial decision, it could upset voters who want their children
to receive a demanding, top-notch public education. In all likelihood, states
would find a middle ground, and water down standards to an affordable, but
still politically tenable, level. But for many students who are deprived of
social studies, even the implementation of middling standards would likely
lead to a more robust civic education. States would probably be unwilling to
completely eliminate their social studies standards, and judicially mandated
implementation of even watered-down standards could give many students
exposure to a basic civics education that they might not have otherwise en-
joyed.
CONCLUSION
The woeful state of civic education in America stands as a potential af-
front to the judiciary's historic conception of education as the "foundation
of good citizenship." '' Given the judiciary's repeated declarations about the
civic nature of education, there is at least a plausible claim that any post-
Rodriguez quantum of education that is protected by the U.S. Constitution
includes a right to social studies instruction. But the questionable existence
of such a quantum---combined with the federal judiciary's current emphasis
on local, legislative control over schools-means that a federal challenge to
a deprivation of social studies faces dubious prospects, at best. State courts
provide the best hope for a judicial remedy to social studies cutbacks. The
plain text of some education provisions, the history behind the ratification of
others, and the framework established by school finance cases all provide
plausible bases for challenges brought on behalf of social studies-deprived
students. Finally, it is theoretically possible that courts could require states
to provide students with the level of education outlined in state standards. If
courts act to restore the long-recognized civic aspect of education, they
could finally begin to shore up America's crumbling foundations of good
citizenship.
221. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
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